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"IF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY MEANS
ANYTHING": EXCLUSION FROM THE
UNITED STATES MILITARY ON THE
BASIS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION
Phyllis E. Mann
When I was in the military they gave me a medal for killing two men,
and a discharge for loving one.I
I. INTRODUCTION
HROUGHOUT the history of the United States military, homosexu-
als2 have been excluded from service.3 Prior to 1982, each branch of
the military adopted and enforced its own regulations for exclusion
and discharge of homosexuals. 4 In 1982, all branches of the service adopted
1. Epitaph on the tombstone of Leonard Matlovich in the Congressional Cemetary in
Washington, D.C. (quoted in MARY ANN HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE
154 (1990)).
2. Throughout this Comment, the terms homosexual and heterosexual are used solely
for purposes of clarity. This should in no way be taken to endorse the belief that individuals fit
neatly into one of these two categories. Scientific studies of sexual orientation from 1948 to the
present suggest that sexual orientation is best explained as a continuum ranging from an exclu-
sive homosexual identity to an exclusive heterosexual identity with variations of degree in
activity. See, e.g., A. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE (1948)
[hereinafter KINSEY STUDY]; THE WOLFENDEN REPORT, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
HOMOSEXUAL AFFAIRS AND PROSTITUTION (1963); A.P. MacDonald, Bisexuality: Some
Comments on Research and Theory, 6 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 21 (1982); Theodore R. Sarbin &
Kenneth E. Karols, Nonconforming Sexual Orientations and Military Suitability C-5 (Dec.
1988) (unpublished draft report PERS-TR-89-002 of the Defense Personnel Security Research
and Education Center [hereinafter PERSEREC Report]), quoted in full in GAYS IN UNIFORM;
THE PENTAGON'S SECRET REPORTS 3-97 (Kate Dyer ed., 1990) [hereinafter GAYS IN UNI-
FORM]. The KINSEY STUDY, considered to be the most authoritative, found that forty-six
percent of all white men had had some homosexual experience during their adult life and could
thus be considered bisexual. KINSEY STUDY, supra at 656; PERSEREC Report, supra at D-1
to D-2. Additionally, current definitions of nontraditional sexuality include transsexuals, who
could be classified ai homosexual during one segment of their lives and heterosexual during the
remainder, and transvestites, who could be classified as either heterosexual, bisexual, or homo-
sexual depending on their sexual activity. U.S. Defense Department policy makes none of
these distinctions. See Department of Defense Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt.
l.H.l.a. (1991) [hereinafter DOD Directive 1332.14]. Rather, at least for investigative pur-
poses, the Defense Department considers even a single desire for sexual gratification with the
same sex to qualify one as homosexual. Id.
3. GAYS IN UNIFORM, supra note 1, at xiii.
4. The Army regulation provided for the separation of individuals evidencing homosex-
ual "tendencies, desires, or interests", but retention was discretionary. Army Reg. 635-200,
Personnel Separations, Enlisted Personnel, paras. 13-14 (Jul. 15, 1966) (C39, Nov. 23, 1972).
The Navy regulation provided for discharge of homosexuals with no explicit exception. Secre-
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Department of Defense Directive 1332.14. 5 This directive requires disclo-
sure of sexual orientation prior to induction into the service.6 Homosexuals
are excluded if they commit any act of sodomy.7 They are excluded, based
on their status as homosexuals, even if they have not committed "homosex-
ual acts." '8
Both prior to and since the adoption of the 1982 policy, the exclusion of
homosexuals has been challenged as unconstitutional. Courts have consist-
ently found, however, that the policy of exclusion is permissible because: (1)
there is no constitutional right to commit homosexual sodomy;9 (2) the mili-
tary regulations excluding homosexuals are rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest;10 and (3) the courts must defer to the military and
allow it to determine its own policies and regulations. 11 (2) whether the right
of privacy protects an individual from discrimination based on status as a
homosexual; 12 and (3) whether the right of privacy protects an individual
from discrimination based on private consensual sexual behavior between
adults. 13
This comment first discusses the development of the right of privacy in
sexual activity under the Constitution. It then presents the basis for adop-
tion of the 1982 military policy toward homosexuals and a discussion of
judicial decisions regarding exclusion of homosexuals on the basis of disclo-
sure, status, and conduct. Finally, it suggests that the failure of courts to
distinguish between status as a homosexual and the conduct of criminal sod-
omy has resulted in the application of an erroneous constitutional standard.
In conclusion, this Comment asserts that the right of privacy should protect
homosexuals against exclusion from the military on the basis of status and
tary of the Navy Instruction 1900.9A (July 31, 1972). The Air Force regulation also provided
that homosexuals would be separated from the service, but allowed an exception in "unusual
circumstances". Air Force Manual, 39-12, para. 2-103 (C4, Oct. 21, 1970).
5. DOD Directive 1332.14, supra note 1.
6. Id. at pt.1.H.1.c.(2).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92 (1986).
10. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 465 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rich v. Secretary
of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1228 (10th Cir. 1984); Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641
F.2d 1376, 1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981); Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d
788, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855
(1981). But cf Pruitt v. Cheney, No. 87-5914, 1992 WL 92128, at *7 (9th Cir. May 8, 1992)
(remanding to district court for Army to demonstrate rational relationship between regulation
and military goals). Most courts have required only that the exclusionary regulations be
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. This is because few courts have found
that a fundamental right is implicated by the regulations, see Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191-92,
and homosexuality has not yet been established as a suspect class. See infra note 69.
11. See Rich, 735 F.2d at 1224; see also infra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
12. See Woodward, 871 F.2d at 1071; Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp.
964, 975 (E.D. Wis. 1980); see also infra notes 134-144, 77-82 and accompanying text.
13. See Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1388-89; Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1382; Matlovich v. Sec-
retary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also infra notes 205-216, 196-
202, 179-183 and accompanying text.
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from the requirement of disclosure, and further that there is no contempo-
rary factual basis for excluding homosexuals from the military.
II. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 14
A. Historical Origins
The phrase "right of privacy" or "the right to be let alone" is said to have
originated from a law review article 15 written by Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis in 1890.16 Adopting the idea promoted in that article, some state
courts began to protect privacy as a common law right.' 7 The Supreme
Court from 1890 until 1965 spoke of privacy only as a necessary element in
affording other rights enumerated by the Constitution.'8 Until 1965 the
Court did not acknowledge privacy as a constitutionally protected right. 19
14. The concept of privacy is a broad philosophical area that this Comment does not
attempt to define or address. The right of privacy in American jurisprudence is likewise broad
and not the subject of this Comment. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmts.
a, b, c (1991). This analysis centers on the right of privacy in the area of private sexual
behavior.
15. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
16. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.l (1965) (Black, J., dissenting); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A cmt. a (1991); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Pri-
vacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 703 (1990).
17. The Georgia Supreme Court was the first to give credence to this view. See Pavesich
v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). But cf. De May v. Roberts, 9 N.W. 146
(Mich. 1881) (awarding damages to woman for invasion of her privacy during childbirth, but
not recognized by later courts as contributing to privacy rights). This is somewhat ironic in
view of the laws infringing on the right of privacy which have originated from the State of
Georgia since that time. See infra notes 33-35, 46-56 and accompanying text. Another state
which quickly recognized a right of privacy was Michigan. See Atkinson v. John E. Doherty
& Co., 80 N.W. 285 (Mich. 1899). But see Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1895) (refus-
ing to find that common law privacy protected a woman against unauthorized use of her
photograph).
18. See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505 (1964) (protecting the right to
travel as a liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449,
462-63 (1958) (finding distribution of group membership lists would violate privacy in associa-
tion); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (protecting the fundamental and basic
liberty of procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (protecting the
private decision of where to educate children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-01 (1923)
(protecting the private decision of what to learn as inherent in the First Amendment).
19. In 1928, Justice Brandeis rendered his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928). The case presented the issue of whether private telephone conversations,
recorded with a federal wire tap, could be used as evidence in a criminal trial. Id. at 564. In
finding that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments were violated, Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the
pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature,
of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain,
pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought
to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone
- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.
Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). With great foresight, he also noted that "[w]ays may some
day be developed by which the Government ... will be enabled to expose to a jury the most
intimate occurrences of the home. . . . Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection
against such invasions of individual security?" Id. at 474.
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The framework of the right of privacy in the area of sexual behavior devel-
oped on a case-by-case basis.
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy
The Supreme Court recognized a constitutional right of privacy for the
first time in Griswold v. Connecticut.20 The Court, with three Justices dis-
senting, found a peripheral right of privacy in the "penumbra" of the First
Amendment. 2' The Court also found that a zone of privacy was necessary
to support other guarantees of the Bill of Rights, including the First Amend-
ment right of association, the Third Amendment prohibition against quar-
tering of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable
search and seizure, the Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause, and the
Ninth Amendment generally. 22 On appeal from the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors, Estelle Griswold challenged the constitutionality of a state
statute which criminalized the use of contraceptives for purposes of birth
control.23 The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it
invaded the protected freedom of privacy in the marriage relationship. 24
The Court extended the Griswold holding to unmarried persons in Eisen-
stadt v. Baird.25 In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court found that a Massachu-
setts statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons
was not rationally related to a valid public purpose.2 6 The Court concluded
that married and unmarried persons have the same rights with regard to
receiving contraceptives. 27 The Court found, therefore, that the statute vio-
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. Id. at 482-84. "[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance." Id. at 484.
22. Id. at 484. Contra id. at 508-10 (Black & Stewart, JJ., dissenting). The dissent noted:
The Court talks about a constitutional "right of privacy" as though there is
some constitutional provision or provisions forbidding any law ever to be passed
which might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. But there is not .... I get
nowhere in this case by talk about a constitutional "right of privacy" as an
emanation from one or more constitutional provisions. I like my privacy as well
as the next one, but I am nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a
right to invade it unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.
Id. See also id. at 530 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("With all deference, I can find no such general
right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever
before decided by this Court.").
23. Id. at 479. It was legal to use contraceptives for disease control. See id. at 498
(Goldberg & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
24. Id. at 485-86. The Court recited the legal principle that "a 'governmental purpose to
control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected free-
doms.'" Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1963)). It may be
inferred from this principle that any regulation which infringed on protected freedoms or fun-
damental rights would be declared overbroad and in violation of the Constitution. This has
not held to be true. The principle has been restated to say that, with regard to the military and
other particular areas, regulations may restrict protected freedoms "no more than is reason-
ably necessary to protect the substantial governmental interest." Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S.
348, 355 (1980).
25. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
26. Id. at 443.
27. Id. at 453.
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lated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Conse-
quently, the Court did not reach the question of whether the fundamental
right of privacy was violated. 28 In dicta, however, the Court stated:
[I]n Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each
with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of pri-
vacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or be-
get a child. 29
The freedom from unjustified governmental intervention in childbearing de-
cisions was reaffirmed by the Court in Roe v. Wade30 and Carey v. Popula-
tion Services International 31.
In Stanley v. Georgia,32 the Supreme Court heard the appeal of a Georgia
citizen convicted of possessing of obscene material. Federal and state agents
had found pornographic films in the appellant's home while searching for
evidence of bookmaking activities. The Court held that mere possession of
obscene materials could not be considered a crime in light of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. 33 Although not all of the Justices reached the
First Amendment issues in this case, 34 there was no dissent from the holding
that individuals are free to read or view what they choose in the privacy of
their homes. These decisions led to questions about precisely what behavior,
particularly when occurring in the home, would receive constitutional pro-
tection under the right of privacy.
C. The Extent of Constitutional Privacy in Sexual Behavior
In the 1970s courts began to explore the degree to which the right of pri-
vacy would protect adult consensual sexual behavior.35 Because there was
28. Id. at 447 n.7.
29. Id. at 453.
30. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
31. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
32. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
33. Id. at 568. Although noting that the regulation of obscenity was a valid governmental
concern, Justice Marshall stated that a prosecution for possession of obscene materials in the
privacy of one's home "takes on an added dimension. For also fundamental is the right to be
free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's
privacy." Id. at 564. He further stated:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what
films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of
giving government the power to control men's minds.
Id. at 565.
34. Id. at 569.
35. See Carey, 431 U.S. at 684 ("[the] right of personal privacy includes 'the interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions'[, yet] the outer limits of this
aspect of privacy have not been marked by the Court" (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977))); Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17 ("the Court has not definitively answered the
difficult question whether and to what extent the Constitution prohibits state statutes regulat-
ing [private consensual sexual] behavior among adults").
1992]
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no clear Supreme Court ruling on the limits of the constitutional protection
of privacy in sexual relations, lower courts rendered disparate rulings on this
issue. 36 The first sign of guidance from the Supreme Court came when the
Court summarily affirmed the ruling of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney.37
A three-judge district court, with one judge dissenting, upheld as constitu-
tional a Virginia statute criminalizing sodomy as applied to homosexual rela-
tions.38 The appellants contended that the statute was invalid as applied to
private consensual adult homosexual behavior under the First and Ninth
Amendment guarantees of privacy and various other provisions of the Bill of
Rights. The majority based its holding primarily on the limiting language in
Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold.3 9 Justice Goldberg's
concurrence had quoted Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman,4° which
had indicated that Griswold did not limit the government's right to regulate
behavior outside of heterosexual marriage. 4 1 As Judge Merhige pointed out
in his dissent in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, reliance on Justice
36. See Lovisi v. Slayton, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976). In
the Fourth Circuit, the right of privacy apparently extended only to private consensual hetero-
sexual behavior between two adults. Aldo and Margaret Lovisi, a married couple, were con-
victed and imprisoned under a Virginia sodomy statute for engaging in oral sex in the bedroom
of their home. Id. at 350. Unfortunately for the Lovisis, they had invited a third person to
join them on this occasion. The court acknowledged that "the marital intimacies shared by the
Lovisis when alone and in their own bedroom are within their protected right of privacy...
[and are] beyond the power of the state to scrutinize." Id. at 351. The right of privacy was
waived, however, when a third person was allowed as an onlooker because "the married couple
has welcomed a stranger to the marital bedchamber, and what they do is no longer in the
privacy of their marriage." Id. See also Fugate v. Phoenix Civil Serv. Bd., 791 F.2d 736-41
(9th Cir. 1986) (discharge of police officers for sexual activity with prostitutes while on duty
not violative of right of privacy); Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022 (1986) (sodomy statute criminalizing homosexual activity not violative
of privacy or equal protection); Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444, 446
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (no violation of rights where school teacher
dismissed after stating she was bisexual); Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 472 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom., Whisenhut v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965 (1983) (no violation of privacy
rights where police officers disciplined for off-duty sexual relationship in violation of depart-
ment regulations). But see City of North Muskegon v. Briggs, 563 F. Supp. 585, 591 (D. Mich.
1983), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1475 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 909 (1985) (right of sexual
privacy infringed where police officer suspended for engaging in adulterous relationship);
Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 471 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979
(1984) (private, off-duty sexual activities of city employee protected by rights of privacy and
free association); New York v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936, 937-38 (N.Y. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 987 (1981) (sodomy statute criminalizing activity between nonmarried persons violated
right of privacy and equal protection).
37. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), aff'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (D.
Va. 1975).
38. 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1200 (D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
39. Id. at 1201 (citing Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring)).
40. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 347 U.S.
497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
41. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Adultery, homosex-
uality and the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids .... "). The Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney opinion also independently relied on Justice Harlan's view that "adultery,
homosexuality, fornication and incest are [not] immune from criminal enquiry [sic], however
privately practiced." Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1201-02 (quoting Poe v. Ull-
man, 347 U.S. at 552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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Harlan's dissent was questionable. 42 By the time of the Poe v. Ullman rul-
ing, the Eisenstadt case had extended the right of privacy beyond the marital
relationship. 43 Presumably, this had limited the power of the state to legis-
late against heterosexual, and possibly homosexual, fornication. The
Supreme Court summarily affirmed the holding of Doe v. Commonwealth's
Attorney with three Justices indicating they would note probable
jurisdiction."
In 1986 the Court determined that the right of privacy does not extend to
private consensual homosexual conduct between adults. 45 In Bowers v.
Hardwick, a majority of five held that they were unwilling to find "a funda-
mental right to engage in homosexual sodomy."'46 The majority specifically
limited its ruling to homosexual sodomy,47 although the Georgia statute
before the Court criminalized any act of oral or anal sex, whether committed
by persons of the same or opposite sex.4 8 Both the majority and the dissent
noted that this decision did not address the Eighth or Ninth Amendments or
the Equal Protection Clause.49 Writing for the majority, Justice White re-
viewed the constitutional privacy cases and proclaimed that homosexual
sodomy was not in any way related to the protected areas of child rearing
and education, family relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception, or
abortion.50 In a lengthy discussion, the Court proscribed a right to engage
in homosexual sodomy by finding that this activity did not meet the stan-
dards established for recognition as a fundamental right.
51
42. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. at 1203-04 (Merhige, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1204 (Merhige, J., dissenting) (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453).
44. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. at 901.
45. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986).
46. Id. at 191.
47. Id. at 188 n.2.
48. Id. at 200. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Georgia Legislature has not proceeded
on the assumption that homosexuals are so different from other citizens that their lives may be
controlled in a way that would not be tolerated if it limited the choices of those other citi-
zens."); cf Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
concurring):
The framers of the Constitution knew and we should not forget today, that there
is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable gov-
ernment than to require that the principles of law which officials would impose
upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens the
door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and
choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and thus to escape the
political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were af-
fected. Courts can take no better measure to assure the laws will be just than to
require that laws be equal in operation.
49. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196 n.8, 201.
50. Id. at 190-91.
51. Id. at 191-92. The Court determined that homosexual acts were "neither 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if (they] were
sacrificed" nor "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Id. (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 326 (1937) and Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977) (alterations in original).
In elucidating the "ancient roots" of sodomy laws, the opinion fully enumerates the state
penal statutes prohibiting sodomy in effect in 1791 and in 1868. Id. at 192-94. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Powell cites to the twenty-four state sodomy laws in effect in 1986 as support
for his view that the Eighth Amendment may well provide protection against the Georgia
19921
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The dissent in Hardwick characterized the case as an issue of the funda-
mental right of privacy and freedom in intimate association. 52 Because the
dissent found that a fundamental right had been violated, they would have
required the State of Georgia to demonstrate a compelling interest in regu-
lating the proscribed behavior.53 The majority had declared that homosex-
ual sodomy bore no resemblance to the activities protected under previous
privacy cases. 54 The dissent responded that protection was afforded to such
activities because of the importance they held in the lives of each individual
and not because of their societal value. 55
D. Limitations on Privacy and the Reach of Bowers v. Hardwick.
The right of privacy is not absolute. The protection of the right of privacy
statute's penalty of up to twenty years imprisonment. Id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
Although relying heavily on historical and current state laws for support, the majority did not
acknowledge that almost all of those statutes criminalized both heterosexual and homosexual
activity. Id. at 214-16 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Hardwick which considers
sodomy laws in an historical sense, see Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Polit-
ical Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073
(1988).
52. Id. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("what the Court really has refused to recognize
is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their intimate as-
sociations with others."); see id. at 199 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This case is [not] about 'a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy,' as the Court purports to declare ....[T]his case is about 'the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men,' namely, 'the right to be let alone.' " (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
53. Id. at 208, 208 n.3 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
If [the right of privacy] means anything, it means that, before [a state] can prose-
cute its citizens for making choices about the most intimate aspects of their lives,
it must do more than assert that the choice they have made is an "abominable
crime not fit to be named among Christians."
Id. at 199-200 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Herring v. State, 46 S.E. 876, 882 (Ga.
1904)). In attacking the historical ground upon which the majority based its decision, Justice
Blackmun wrote:
I cannot agree that either the length of time a majority has held its convictions
or the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from this
Court's scrutiny.... It is precisely because the issue raised by this case touches
the heart of what makes individuals what they are that we should be especially
sensitive to the rights of those whose choices upset the majority.
Id. at 210-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) ("Pri-
vate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect."); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) ("Mere public intolerance or
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's physical liberty.")
54. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
55. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent explained:
We protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material
way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an
individual's life.... The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant
way through their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation
as diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting those
relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will come from the
freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely per-
sonal bonds .... [A] necessary corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose
how to conduct their lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will
make different choices.
Id. at 204-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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is most frequently sought through due process or equal protection 56 chal-
lenges. In both types of challenges, if the challenged regulation does not
infringe on the right of privacy, then it will be upheld if it is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate state interest. If the right of privacy is infringed, the
legislation limiting that right must serve a compelling governmental interest
and must do so in the narrowest way possible.57 If the law "sweeps too
broadly", 5 8 it will be invalidated. 59 If the legislation is found to serve a com-
pelling interest and to limit the right of privacy in the narrowest possible
manner, then it will be upheld as constitutional. 6°
A substantive due process challenge alleges that a law deprives an individ-
ual of the right to act in an otherwise legal way. The test in these cases is
whether the regulated conduct is so "deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition" as to merit due process protection. In other words, due pro-
cess protects acts which the majority has traditionally felt entitled to engage
in. If the conduct is found to be protected, then the courts will balance the
nature of the individual interest against the importance of the governmental
interest furthered by the law. The courts also consider the degree to which
the individual interest is infringed and the ability of the government to
achieve a less infringing method of furthering its interest.
Both Griswold and Hardwick addressed substantive due process challenges
to the law.6 1 The outcome of these two cases was predetermined by the
Court's framing of the issue. In Griswold, the Court focused on the area of
life in which a particular behavior occurs. The Griswold Court questioned
whether the government could interfere in the marital decision of whether to
bear children yet did not question whether there was a constitutional right to
take birth control pills or wear a condom. The Court found that the right of
56. Equal protection is applied to federal law under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). In Boiling, the Court said:
The Fifth Amendment ... does not contain an equal protection clause as does
the Fourteenth Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts
of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The "equal protection of the laws" is a
more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness than "due process of law," and,
therefore, we do not imply that the two are always interchangeable phrases.
But, as this Court has recognized, discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be
violative of due process.
Id. at 499.
57. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).
58. NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1963).
59. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
60. Id. But cf Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting):
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the
Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally alert
to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to
liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
Id.
61. For a general discussion of the application of substantive due process to the right of
privacy, see Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal
Tradition: Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723 (1990).
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privacy in the marriage relationship may not be invaded by legislation. 62
Thus, the fundamental right of privacy was protected. In Hardwick, how-
ever, the Court focused on the particular activity regulated by the legisla-
tion. The Hardwick Court did not ask whether the government could
interfere in the private and highly personal decision of who one's sexual
partner should be; rather, the Court focused on whether there was a consti-
tutional right to engage in homosexual sodomy. 63 The Court then found
that this behavior was not a fundamental right protected by the Constitu-
tion.64 Accordingly, where a due process challenge is raised, activities pro-
tected under the right of privacy can only be distinguished from those that
are not on a case-by-case basis.
Because the ruling of Hardwick focused on the narrow behavior of homo-
sexual sodomy, it is not determinative of whether the right of privacy pro-
tects an indiviudal's status of being homosexual. It also did not determine
whether the right of privacy protects an individual from being forced to dis-
close his or her sexual orientation. This is significant in the military context
because homosexuals are excluded from the military on the basis of their
status as homosexuals and not because of the commission of sodomy. Thus,
the standard to be met by the military's exclusionary policy is not estab-
lished by the Hardwick ruling.
Equal protection ensures the rights of minorities against majoritarian rule.
There are two branches of equal protection analysis. In the first branch, it is
alleged that a law discriminates in the exercise of a fundamental right. 65 If a
fundamental right is infringed in a discriminatory way, then the law which
discriminates must do so in order to serve a compelling governmental inter-
est and must infringe no more than necessary on the fundamental right.
Again, Hardwick has determined that there is no fundamental right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy. Thus, any statute that discriminates on this
basis does not implicate a fundamental right. The military policy, however,
discriminates on the basis of status rather than conduct. If the right of pri-
vacy protects an individual's right to be homosexual or to refuse to divulge
his or her sexuality, then discrimination on this basis could be found to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause.66
62. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 585-86. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
63. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
64. Id. Another example of the way in which characterization of the issue can determine
whether the right of privacy is invoked is found in the continuing debate over Roe v. Wade.
Pro-choice proponents claim that women have a constitutional right of privacy in the area of
child-bearing into which state regulation may not intrude. Opponents, on the other hand,
claim there is no constitutional right to terminate a pregnancy and, therefore, abortion may be
regulated or abolished.
65. Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1014 (1985) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
66. See Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals.- Scientific, Historical, and
Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REV. 55 (1991); John Charles Hayes, The Tradition of Preju-
dice Versus the Principle of Equality: Homosexuals and Heightened Equal Protection Scrutiny
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 31 B.C. L. REV. 375 (1990). But see Craig W. Stedman, The
Constitution, the Military, and Homosexuals. Should the Military's Policies Concerning Homo-
sexuals be Modified?, 95 DICK. L. REV. 321 (1991).
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The second branch of equal protection analysis is applied to legislation
discriminating against a particular class of individuals.67 The Supreme
Court has not ruled on whether homosexuality is a suspect classification.
68
III. MILITARY POLICY TOWARD HOMOSEXUALS
The military has great latitude in enacting and enforcing regulations re-
garding its servicemembers. 69 While the courts will consider constitutional
challenges to military action, they do so with great deference. 70 Further, the
degree of protection afforded to servicemembers under the Bill of Rights has
traditionally been less than the protection given the civilian population.
7 1
The combination of a lower standard of protection and a higher standard of
deference has created a formidable hurdle to successful challenges to the
constitutionality of military regulations.
A. Advent of the Current Regulations
Official United States military policy states that "homosexuality is incom-
patible with military service."'72 The Defense Department asserts that
homosexuals in the military will create security problems, lessen public ac-
67. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440.
68. Justice Brennan, in his dissent from denial of certioriari in Rowland v. Mad River
Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting), denying cert. to 730 F.2d 444
(6th Cir. 1984), noted that laws discriminating against homosexuals on the basis of their sexual
orientation raise both prongs of equal protection analysis. Rowland, 470 U.S. at 1014. He
strongly indicated that homosexuals meet the requirements of a suspect class and, further, that
discrimination on the basis of sexual preference often violates fundamental rights such as pri-
vacy. Id. at 1014-15. Noting the disparate rulings among the circuits on these issues, Justice
Brennan felt it was time for the Court to resolve them. Id. at 1018. See Marion Halliday
Lewis, Unacceptable Risk or Unacceptable Rhetoric? An Argument for a Quasi-Suspect Classi-
fication for Gays Based on Current Government Security Clearance Procedures, 7 J.L. & POL.
133 (1990); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (1985).
69. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357 (1980); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756
(1974).
70. The Court, in upholding Air Force regulations which prohibited a Jewish officer from
wearing a yarmulke, said "when evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restric-
tion ... courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities
concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest." Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986). One commentator has argued that deference to the military in the
area of exclusion of homosexuals has allowed the continuing application of an unconstitutional
regulation. See Seth Harris, Permitting Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection, Military Defer-
ence, and the Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men from the Military, 17 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 171 (1990). For a general discussion of the appropriateness of judicial deference to
the military, see Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference that is Due: Rethinking the Jurisprudence
of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1009 (1990).
71. Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507. In Goldman, the Court stated: "The military need not
encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian
state by the First Amendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive
obedience, unity, commitment and esprit de corps." Id. See also Brown, 444 U.S. at 354 ("The
rights of military men must yield somewhat 'to meet certain overriding demands of discipline
and duty.,..' " (quoting Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140 (1953))); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 758 (1974) ("The fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for
imposition of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be con-
stitutionally impermissible outside it.").
72. DOD Directive 1332.14, supra note I.
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ceptance of the military and the ability to recruit members, complicate as-
signment and deployment of personnel, and deter discipline, trust,
confidence, and the integrity of the rank and command system.73 Prior to
1982, each branch of the military had separate regulations for the exclusion
and discharge of homosexuals. 74 Responding to a successful challenge to the
Army's discharge regulation, in 1982 the Department of Defense issued di-
rectives that standardized military policy on homosexual personnel. 7
Previously, Army regulations had required the discharge of any soldier
who evidenced "homosexual tendencies, desire, or interest."' 76 Miriam Ben-
Shalom was discharged from the United States Army Reserves on December
1, 1976 because she was homosexual. After exhausting administrative reme-
dies, Ben-Shalom brought a mandamus action in the Eastern District of Wis-
consin seeking reinstatement in the Reserves. She alleged that the discharge
violated her constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments.
The district court held that there was no violation of procedural due pro-
cess under the Fifth Amendment because Ben-Shalom could not establish a
protectable property or liberty interest. 77 Ben-Shalom's First Amendment
challenge was upheld. The court held that the regulation was overbroad
because it substantially "impinge[d] the first amendment rights of every sol-
dier to free association, expression, and speech."'78 Furthermore, the court
held that Ben-Shalom's right to personal privacy was infringed. 79 As a re-
73. Id. The policy states:
Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in the mili-
tary environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or who, by
their statements, demonstrate a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct,
seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military mission. The presence of
such members adversely affects the ability of the Military Services to maintain
discipline, good order, and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among
servicemembers; to ensure the integrity of the system to rank and command; to
facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers who fre-
quently must live and work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to
recruit and retain members of the Military Services; to maintain the public ac-
ceptability of military service; and to prevent breaches of security.
Id.
74. See supra note 3.
75. DOD Directive 1332.14, supra note 1. The branch regulations currently in effect are
U.S. Army Regulation 635-200, SEC/NAV Instruction 1900.9C, and Air Force Manual 39-10,
Chapter 5, Section 6. These regulations provide for mandatory discharge of any person who
has committed a homosexual act, claimed to be homosexual, or married or attempted to marry
someone of the same sex. The only exception is for a person who is not homosexual. Id.
76. U.S. Army Regulation 135-178, 7-5b(6).
77. Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of Army, 489 F. Supp. 964, 971 (E.D. Wis. 1980) [Ben-
Shalom I].
78. Id. at 974. The court found that the regulations, as worded, would prohibit reading or
learning about homosexuality or meeting with homosexuals or even talking about homosexual-
ity for fear that any of these things could be taken as having an interest in homosexuality. The
opinion noted that the regulation was a "tool for intimidation and harassment" which
threatened protected activities. Id.
79. Id. at 975. Judge Evans drew a clear distinction between status as a homosexual and
the commission of homosexual conduct. He indicated that personality and its lawful manifes-
tations were areas into which the government could not intrude. Because Ben-Shalom was
discharged solely because of her identity as a homosexual, the court found that this violated
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suit, the Army was ordered to reinstate Ben-Shalom as a reservist.80 The
Secretary of the Army initially appealed the district court's order, but later
withdrew its appeal.8 '
In response to the district court's ruling in Ben-Shalom,8 2 the Department
of Defense promulgated an altered definition of homosexual. This definition
purportedly eliminated the language that the district court had found to be
overbroad: "homosexual tendencies, desire, or interest." The new directives
defined a homosexual as "a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires
to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts."'8 3
B. Challenges to the Policy on Homosexuality
1. Disclosure of Sexual Orientation
When enlisting for service in the United States armed forces, a recruit
must complete DD Form 1966/2.84 This form asks if the recruit is a homo-
sexual or a bisexual and whether the recruit "intend[s] to engage in homo-
sexual acts."8 5 An affirmative response to either question constitutes a
nonwaivable bar to enlistment.8 6 The failure to honestly answer these ques-
tions provides a basis for discharge.8 7 The Supreme Court has not ruled on
the constitutionality of this disclosure requirement.
88
In 1977, Roger Rich was involuntarily discharged from the Army. The
Army asserted that Rich lied when he denied on his enlistment papers that
he was homosexual.8 9 Rich appealed his discharge and it was upheld as
valid.90 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit found that the Army had "a compel-
her right of privacy in her self-image, her personality and its manifestations, and her very
identity, all of which were protected. Id.
80. Id. at 977.
81. Ben-Shalom v. Secretary of the Army, 807 F.2d 982, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
82. Id. at 983 n.i; 46 Fed. Reg. 9571 (1981).
83. DOD Directive 1332.14, supra note 1. A homosexual act is "bodily contact, actively
undertaken or passively permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfy-
ing sexual desires." Id. at 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. l.H.L.b.(3).
84. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DD FORM 1966/2, S/N 0102-LF-006-2100 (Jan. 1989).
85. Id. at 2.
86. DOD Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. l.H.I.c.(2) (1991).
87. See DOD Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. 1.E.4.a. (1991) which states:
A member may be separated ... on the basis of procurement of a fraudulent
enlistment, induction, or period of military service through any deliberate mate-
rial misrepresentation, omission, or concealment which, if known at the time of
enlistment, induction, or entry onto a period of military service, might have
resulted in rejection.
Id.
88. Cf Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (in dicta) ("The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimina-
tion Clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force
him to surrender to his detriment.")
89. Rich claimed that he was unsure of his sexual orientation at the time of his enlistment.
Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1223 (10th Cir. 1984).
90. Id. at 1224. The court below had found the requirement of disclosure justified because
"sexual perversion is a non-waivable moral and administrative disqualification" to service in
the Army. Rich v. Secretary of Army, 516 F. Supp. 621, 626 (D. Colo. 1981), aff'd, 735 F.2d
1220 (10th Cir. 1984). The trial court also found the Army to be justified in concluding that
Rich was, at the time of enlistment, "a homosexual who had committed homosexual acts." Id.
at 628. Even if no homosexual conduct had occurred, the district court reasoned that status as
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ling interest in maintaining a strong military force." 9 1 The court concluded
that "if the Army were unable to exclude homosexuals it would 'severely
compromise the government's ability to maintain such a force.' ",92 The
court held that any incidental imposition on fundamental rights was permis-
sible because of the "special needs of the military."'93 Finally, it found that
the Army had demonstrated a compelling interest "in maintaining the disci-
pline and morale of the armed forces."'94 The Tenth Circuit did not distin-
guish between the requirement of disclosure, discharge for status as a
homosexual, or homosexual conduct. 95 Instead, the court based its conclu-
sions solely on homosexual conduct.96
One rationale for requiring disclosure of sexuality on the enlistment form
is that the military has a legitimate interest in ensuring that its members do
not break the law. Since sodomy is illegal under the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice (UCMJ), 97 an admission that a recruit intended to commit sod-
omy would be evidence of intent to commit a crime. Under the UCMJ
heterosexual sodomy is also a crime, 98 yet no enlistment form asks whether
the recruit intends to commit an illegal heterosexual act.
In 1982 a Washington district court found that the Army was equitably
estopped from refusing to reenlist Perry Watkins because it had previously
reenlisted him with full knowledge that he was homosexual. 99 On the day
the order was rendered the Army conducted a new hearing regarding Wat-
kins' reenlistment and questioned him about his sexual practices. In re-
a homosexual brought Rich within the exclusion policy in which the government had a com-
pelling interest. Id. Therefore, even if Rich had been wrongfully discharged for fraudulent
enlistment, by his own admission of homosexuality the Army could discharge him for his
status. Id.
91. Rich, 735 F.2d at 1228 (quoting Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376,
1382 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981)).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1229. The court did not reach the question of whether a privacy interest was
implicated and determined that no "First Amendment rights were directly curtailed." Id. at
1228-29.
94. Id. The court did not explain, and thus one can presume did not feel the need to find,
how any of these "compelling interests" were served by requiring servicemembers to disclose
their sexual orientation or by discharging them for failure to do so.
95. This is particularly noteworthy because the Army did see a need to make this distinc-
tion. Id. at 1223. Rich was discharged for fraudulently misrepresenting that he was not ho-
mosexual. Id. (citing Army Reg. 635-200 ch. 14 (1973)). The Army had initially
recommended his discharge due to unsuitability for service because of homosexuality. Id. (cit-
ing Army Reg. 635-200 ch. 13 (1973)).
96. Id. at 1228 ("Therefore, we hold that even if privacy interests were implicated in this
case, they are outweighed by the Government's interest in preventing armed service members
from engaging in homosexual conduct."); id. at 1229 ("[P]laintiff was not discharged for advo-
cating homosexuality or merely associating with homosexuals. Rather the Army discharged
him because during enlistment he falsely denied having engaged in homosexual activity."); id.
at 1227 (denying substantive due process claim in reliance on Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d
788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981),
which related to homosexual conduct).
97. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1991). Sodomy is defined as "unnatural carnal copulation with an-
other person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal ... Id.
98. Id.
99. Watkins v. United States Army, 551 F. Supp. 212 (D. Wash. 1982), aff'd, 875 F.2d
699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, I l I S. Ct. 384 (1990).
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sponse to Watkins' refusal to answer these questions, the Army filed a
renewed motion for summary judgment alleging that his refusal to discuss
his sexual activities was ground for the Army to refuse to reenlist him. The
Army asserted that it had a legitimate interest in the likelihood that Watkins
would commit criminal acts of sodomy. The court noted that sodomy had
been criminal throughout Watkin's term of service and that the Army had
been aware of his homosexual relations with other servicemen since 1968.'00
With reference to its previous finding of equitable estoppel, the court stated
that "[s]ince defendants are estopped from considering plaintiff's homosexu-
ality as a bar to his reenlistment, they cannot use his refusal to answer ques-
tions concerning his homosexuality as a bar."' 0 1 Thus, Perry Watkins could
not be barred from reenlistment in the Army on the basis of refusal to dis-
close facts about his sexual orientation. This holding was limited, however,
to Watkins and did not extend to all homosexuals in the military. 10 2 Addi-
tionally, the court's order would not prevent Watkins' discharge if he com-
mitted sodomy in the future.103
Few military cases addressing the requirement of disclosure of sexual ori-
entation have reached the courts. Presumably this is because those persons
who disclose their orientation are denied enlistment and have no vested in-
terest, such as years of service, to protect through litigation. Those individu-
als who are homosexual and are admitted to the military did not answer yes
to the questions regarding sexual orientation. Anyone who disputed the
right of the Defense Department to inquire would immediately be suspect.
2 Status as a Homosexual
Mere status as a homosexual is sufficient for discharge under the military's
homosexuality policy. Thus, servicemembers who admit to being homosex-
ual or bisexual may be discharged solely as a result of their status and re-
gardless of their conduct.' ° 4 Furthermore, there is no exception under
which members may be retained in the service after truthfully stating that
they are homosexual or bisexual.' 0 5
One soldier's battle with the military policy on homosexuality spanned ten
years. 0 6 Sergeant Miriam Ben-Shalom prevailed in her first attempt to pre-
100. Id. at 224.
101. Id. at 225.
102. Id. ("the court [has not] stated that the Army cannot use homosexuality as a bar to
the reenlistment of soldiers other than Sergeant Watkins.")
103. Id. ("The court has never said and is not now saying that plaintiff has a right to
commit acts that Congress has declared illegal. Nor has the court attempted to limit the
Army's lawful authority to investigate and prosecute offenses occurring under its
jurisdiction.")
104. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990) ("[Homosexual] acknowledgement, if not an admission of its practice, at least can ra-
tionally and reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and propensity to engage in
homosexual conduct.")
105. See DOD Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. l.H.1.c.(2).
106. Miriam Ben-Shalom challenged first the pre-1982 regulations and then the current
regulations. The judicial opinions addressed her freedom to claim to be lesbian as well as her
constitutional right to be a lesbian and serve in the military, both before and after the Supreme
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vent the Army from discharging her because she was homosexual. After a
ruling in her favor, the Department of Defense issued new guidelines in an
attempt to bring military regulations within the bounds of the Constitution.
Ben-Shalom also challenged the new regulations but ultimately did not
succeed.
Sergeant Ben-Shalom was scheduled to end her enlistment 10 7 in the Army
Reserves on August 11, 1988. She wanted to reenlist but was barred by the
new Army regulations 0 8 that made admission of homosexuality a nonwaiv-
able disqualification to service in the military. On August 3, 1988, the Army
was ordered to consider Ben-Shalom's application for reenlistment without
considering her sexual orientation. 10 9
Despite the court order and a determination that Ben-Shalom met the
reenlistment requirements, the Army refused to reenlist Ben-Shalom. After
contempt proceedings, Ben-Shalom was finally reenlisted until further deter-
mination by the court. On January 10, 1989, Judge Gordon granted a sum-
mary judgment in favor of Ben-Shalom. 10 The court held that the new
regulation was void on its face for violation of the First and Fifth
Amendments. I I '
In granting summary judgment, the court first relied on Ben-Shalom I to
find that Sergeant Ben-Shalom's statements regarding her sexuality were
protected speech under the First Amendment." 2 The district court then
found that the Army was seeking to protect substantial government inter-
ests. 'a Finally, the court found that the regulations were broader than nec-
essary to protect these interests." 4  The court observed that the new
regulations, like the old regulations, required the discharge of any soldier
Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick. These opinions cumulatively address virtually every
issue which has been raised in the ongoing legal dispute over the constitutionality of the U.S.
military's policy excluding homosexuals. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
107. This was the reenlistment pursuant to the order of the Eastern District of Wisconsin
following Ben-Shalom's challenge to her initial discharge based on homosexuality. See supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
108. Army Reserve Regulations, AR 140-111.
109. Ben Shalom v. Marsh, 690 F. Supp. 774, 778 (E.D. Wis. 1988).
110. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372, 1373 (E.D. Wis.), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990) [Ben-Shalom II].
11. Id.
112. Id. at 1375. Ben-Shalom argued that the Army regulations chilled her First Amend-
ment freedom of speech; if she exercised her legal right to say she was lesbian, she would lose
the privilege of serving in the military. In response, the Army argued that Ben-Shalom's state-
ments were not protected speech but were, instead, admissions of intent to commit sodomy.
The court did not address the protected speech versus admissions dichotomy, other than to
state that "BenShalom [sic] I held that Sergeant BenShalom's statements were protected
speech, and the Secretary may not be heard now to assert the contrary." Id. at 1376.
Other courts have considered this distinction. Numerous opinions have held that, while
saying one is homosexual is protected speech, a discharge arising out of a statement that one is
homosexual does not violate the First Amendment. These jurists considered the statement to
be an admission of status as a homosexual. Pruitt v. Cheney, No. 87-5914, 1992 WL 92128, at
*3-4 (9th Cir. May 8, 1992); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
113. Ben-Shalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1376. The Army asserted the seven interests itemized in
the DOD policy statement and adopted in Army regulations, AR 135-178, p. 10-2. Id.
114. Id. at 1377.
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who had a "desire" for homosexual conduct.' 15 The court found there was
no evidence showing that desires of any sort affected the claimed military
interests. ' 16 Thus, the district court held that the regulations excluding indi-
viduals who, by their protected speech, indicated a desire for homosexual
conduct chilled the protections of the First Amendment.'
17
With regard to Ben-Shalom's Fifth Amendment claim, the district judge
held that "homosexuals, as defined by the status of having a particular sex-
ual orientation, constitute a suspect class .... ,"l18 Under an equal protec-
tion analysis, it would have then been appropriate for the court to require
that the Army regulations be shown to be necessary to further a compelling
governmental interest. The district court, however, found that there was no
evidence demonstrating that the regulations were rationally related in any
way to the legitimate military interests asserted. 1 9 Therefore, even if homo-
sexuals did not constitute a suspect class, the regulations would still fail to
provide equal protection. Because the regulations violated the First and
Fifth Amendments, the court granted a permanent injunction against the
Army.12 0 Consequently, Ben-Shalom continued as an enlisted soldier in the
Army Reserves.
On May 18, 1989, more than fifteen years after Ben-Shalom's initial dis-
charge for homosexuality, the Army was authorized to void her reenlistment
in accordance with its regulations. 12 1 The Army had appealed to the Sev-




118. Id. at 1380. The court first distinguished Bowers v. Hardwick and Padula v. Webster
as establishing only that homosexuals, when defined as a group practicing criminal sodomy,
would not be a suspect class. Id. at 1377. The court then was free to consider whether
homosexuality, when defined solely as sexual orientation, could be considered a suspect classi-
fication. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit had held, in a case addressing army regula-
tions barring enlistment of homosexuals, that homosexuals when defined by status constitute a
suspect class. Id. at 1379 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1349 (9th Cir. 1988),
withdrawn on reh'g en banc, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, Ill S.Ct. 384 (1990)).
The court found that purposeful discrimination was imposed on homosexuals as a group. Id.
The military's characterization of homosexuals as being persons who desired to commit crimi-
nal acts of sodomy and the hostility of the pleadings before the court, which compared homo-
sexuals to criminals, evidenced this type of discrimination. Id. Next, the court found that a
person's sexual orientation was a trait which had no bearing on the ability to contribute to
society. Id. Finally, Judge Gordon found that, because only eight to fifteen percent of the
population is estimated to be homosexual, this was a discrete group which was subject to the
prejudicial power of the majority. Id. at 1380. The court did not address whether sexual orien-
tation was an immutable characteristic.
119. Ben-Shalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1380. The court stated: "[t]he elimination of all soldiers
with homosexual orientations from the ranks of the Army is not rationally related to the ad-
vancement of any compelling government interest." Id. In dicta, the court suggested that a
regulation which excluded individuals who had committed criminal sodomy would be permis-
sible because the regulation of criminal conduct advanced the military's asserted interests. The
court refused to presume, however, that any individual who claimed to be homosexual neces-
sarily would commit criminal sodomy. Id.
120. Id. at 1381.





court found that there was no First Amendment violation, 23 but explained
at length that, even if there had been, the rule of deference to the military
would require that the regulations be upheld.' 24 The court of appeals ob-
served that courts were obligated to refrain from impairing the authority of
military commanders because this authority is necessary to achieve the mili-
tary's purpose of protecting and defending the country.125 The Seventh Cir-
cuit recognized that military leaders had determined that the presence of
admitted homosexuals in the military would impair the achievement of the
military mission.' 26 The court, therefore, found that the judiciary could not
question the validity of the Defense Department's decision to exclude homo-
sexuals and must uphold the regulations. 127
The appeals court considered more thoroughly the Fifth Amendment
claim. The court first addressed the suspect class issue. The three-judge
panel found that homosexuals do not constitute a suspect class because the
conduct defining the class may be criminalized. 28 The Seventh Circuit re-
fused to accept a dichotomy between homosexuality as a status of sexual
orientation and homosexuality as a term connoting persons who engage in
criminal acts. 129 The appeals court panel then applied the deferential stan-
123. Id. at 464. This finding precluded the need to consider whether the regulations in-
fringed on fundamental rights only to the degree necessary to achieve the military's purpose.
If the court had found a violation of the First Amendment, it would have still upheld the
regulation, since under the military's reasoning it was necessary to infringe on the right of a
person who claimed to be homosexual in order to preclude these individuals from being en-
listed. This is made clear by the court's statement that:
Even if we assume that the present regulation does have a chilling effect on
protected speech by discouraging proclamations of homosexuality among the
military personnel, we cannot say that that infringement rises to the level of
being unconstitutional. As we have noted, the branches of the military have
great leeway in determining what policies will foster the military mission, and
courts will rarely second-guess those decisions.
Id. at 461.
124. Id. at 459-60. The court of appeals considered that it was bound by the majority
opinion in Brown v. Glines, which established that military regulations protecting a substantial
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of fundamental rights and restricting those
rights no more than reasonably necessary to promote that interest would be upheld. Id. at
458-59 (citing Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980)).
125. Id. at 460. But see Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("This
Court abdicates its responsibility to safeguard [freedoms] when it reflexively bows before the
shibboleth of military necessity.").
126. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 462 ("The Army has determined that the presence of homo-
sexual individuals within its ranks may compromise one or more of its military interests in its
mission of protecting this country."). But see Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. at 367 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("where constitutional rights are at stake, important ends do not sustain mis-
matched means."); Goldman, 475 U.S. at 516 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When a military
service burdens the ... rights of its members in the name of necessity, it must provide, as an
initial matter and at a minimum, a credible explanation of how the contested practice is likely
to interfere with the proffered military interest.").
127. Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 461. The court stated that the military should not "assume
the risk that the presence of homosexuals within the service" would "imperil morale, disci-
pline, and the effectiveness of our fighting forces." Id. at 460, 461.
128. Id. at 464 (relying on Bowers v. Hardwick). Judge Wood noted that to find otherwise
would create "an unjustified and indefensible inconsistency" in applying the Constitution. Id.
at 464-65.
129. Id. at 463-64. The court noted that Ben-Shalom's admission was not just that she had
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dard of equal protection analysis.1 30 There was no question that the inter-
ests asserted by the military were legitimate.' 3' Since the military
considered the regulations necessary to achieve these purposes, the Seventh
Circuit held that the regulations satisfied the deferential standard of re-
view.132 In the final appeal of Ben-Shalom's challenge to the Army regula-
tions, the court found the regulations constitutional. 3 3 The military was
not required to demonstrate how discharging an exemplary reservist who
had served without incident for fifteen years would promote the military
mission.
The Navy was also successful in excluding servicemembers without evi-
dence of any homosexual conduct.134 James Woodward admitted his homo-
sexual orientation in 1974 after serving two years in the Naval Reserves.
Woodward's commanding officer recommended discharge on the basis of ho-
mosexuality but this recommendation was never processed. Following this
admission, however, Woodward was removed from active duty and served
the remainder of his six year term in inactive reserve status without pay.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Woodward argued that his constitu-
tional rights of privacy and equal protection were violated by the release
from active duty.' 35 The court relied on Bowers v. Hardwick in holding that
homosexuality was not protected by a constitutional right of privacy.136 The
court refused to consider a distinction between status and conduct despite
the lack of evidence of any homosexual activity.' 37 Also in reliance on
homosexual tendencies or an interest in homosexuality but rather was that she was a lesbian.
Id. at 464. The court then found that:
Plaintiff's lesbian acknowledgement, if not an admission of its practice, at least
can rationally and reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and pro-
pensity to engage in homosexual conduct... [and] it is compelling evidence that
plaintiff has in the past and is likely to again engage in such conduct. To this
extent, therefore, the regulation does not classify plaintiff based merely upon her
status as a lesbian, but upon reasonable inferences about her probable conduct in
the past and in the future. The Army need not shut its eyes to the practical
realities of this situation, nor be compelled to engage in the sleuthing of soldiers'
personal relationships for evidence of homosexual conduct in order to enforce its
ban on homosexual acts...
Id.
130. Id.
131. See Ben-Shalom, 881 F.2d at 465 (summarily stating that "[fthe new regulation, we
find, clearly promotes a legitimate government interest..."); id. at 459 (itemizing the govern-
ment interests asserted).
132. Id. at 465.
133. Id. at 466.
134. Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1003 (1990).
135. Id. at 1071. As a predicate to consideration of the constitutional issue, the court
determined that Woodward would not have been under consideration for release from active
duty absent his admission of homosexuality. Thus, the Navy could not assert that he would
have been released even without evidence of homosexual tendencies. Id. at 1073-74.
136. Id. at 1074-75.
137. Id. at 1074 n.6. Judge Archer relegated the entire discussion of this argument to a
footnote. Further, the court implied that Woodward would have born the burden of proving
he had not committed homosexual acts stating:
There is no claim by Woodward that he is celibate. Nevertheless, Woodward's
counsel, in his briefs, attempted to characterize Woodward as having only ho-
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Hardwick, the court held there was no violation of equal protection. 38
First, since it saw no distinction between status and conduct, there was no
need to consider equal protection of a fundamental right. 139 Second, the
court found that homosexuals did not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect
class. 140
Since no fundamental right was infringed and no suspect class was in-
volved, the court proceeded to consider whether the Navy's policy was ra-
tionally related to a permissible governmental interest.' 4 ' The opinion
summarily concluded that the policy of discharging homosexuals served the
interests itemized by the Defense Department in its policy on homosexu-
als. 142 The sole basis given for this conclusion was that "the unique needs of
the military ... justify the Navy's determination that homosexual conduct
impairs its capacity to carry out its mission."'' 43 To bolster this finding, the
court stated that it must give special deference to the professional judgment
of the military regarding composition of its forces.'"
Frequently, the military will allow homosexuals to voluntarily resign and
thereby avoid the stigma of discharge papers bearing indications that the
servicemember is homosexual. On May 6, 1988, the Navy accepted the res-
ignation of Midshipman Joseph C. Steffan, which Steffan had submitted to
avoid an involuntary discharge for homosexuality. When Steffan later
sought to withdraw his resignation the Navy refused. Steffan then brought
suit alleging that he was involuntarily separated from the Navy because he
was homosexual and that this violated his constitutional rights. The Navy
initially challenged Steffan's standing to sue, claiming that his resignation
was voluntary. 145 The district court denied the Navy's motion to dismiss for
lack of standing and discovery began. 146
During depositions, Steffan refused to answer questions regarding partici-
pation in homosexual conduct. The Navy moved for dismissal for failure to
comply with discovery. After repeated refusals by Steffan, the court dis-
mosexual tendencies. While acts of sodomy have not been expressly admitted
by Woodward, in view of [his statements acknowledging his homosexuality] we
need not address the factual situation where there is action based solely on "sta-
tus as a person with a homosexual orientation."
Id. (quoting Ben-Shalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1373).
138. Id. at 1075-76.
139. Id. at 1075 & n.8.
140. Id. at 1076.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1076-77.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1077.
145. Steffan first admitted his sexual orientation to his Commander when a classmate at the
Naval Academy told him he was under investigation. After this admission, a review ensued
which culminated in a recommendation of discharge. The Superintendent of the Naval Acad-
emy advised Steffan that he would refrain from making a recommendation of involuntary dis-
charge if Steffan submitted his resignation. Additionally, Steffan was told that his discharge
certificate, if involuntarily discharged, would contain a code indicating he was homosexual,
but that the code would be omitted if he resigned. Steffan had twenty-four hours to make his
decision. Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 115, 116-17 (D. D.C. 1989).
146. Id. at 121.
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missed Steffan's action.1 47 The district court ruled that Steffan had been
discharged based on his statement that he was homosexual and not because
of any homosexual conduct.' 48 The court, however, also held that questions
regarding Steffan's homosexual activities were relevant because the Navy
could refuse reinstatement on the basis of homosexual conduct. 149
On appeal from the dismissal, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed.150 The appeals court held that, since conduct was not the basis of
the separation, homosexual activities were not put into issue by Steffan's
challenge to his separation.51 Steffan's action against the Navy was
reinstated.
After reinstatement, Steffan's action was defeated on a summary judgment
motion.1 5 2 Senior District Judge Gasch ruled that, as a matter of law, the
regulations excluding homosexuals do not violate the Fifth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause.' 5 3 The court held that homosexuals do not consti-
tute a suspect class.154 In so holding, the court found that no fundamental
right was implicated with regard to conduct, citing Bowers v. Hardwick. 155
Judge Gasch also noted that Steffan had not claimed a fundamental right
under the Constitution to have a homosexual orientation.156 Accordingly,
there was no need to address this issue. The court then applied rational basis
review to the Navy's exclusionary regulations.157 Although Steffan was not
charged with the commission of any homosexual activity, the court relied on
Dronenburg,15 a case where conduct had been alleged, and found that case
controlling. 5 9 Judge Gasch determined that the reasons stated by the
Dronenburg court as to why there was a rational basis for the Navy's policy
were equally applicable to Steffan's "non-conduct case."' 60 Additionally,
147. Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 75-76.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 75.
151. Id. at 76.
152. Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. D.C. 1991).
153. Id. at 16.
154. Id. at 10.
155. Id. at 7.
156. Id. In a footnote, the court saw fit to acknowledge Steffan's argument that the term
"homosexual orientation" should apply when discussing status as a homosexual, while the
term "homosexual conduct" should apply when discussing "bodily contact between members
of the same gender designed to elicit a sexual response ...." Id. at 2 n. 1. Considering this
distinction raised by Steffan, the lack of evidence of any sexual conduct on the part of Steffan,
and the claim of a violation of the Equal Protection clause, it is difficult to understand why the
court felt that the fundamental right to be homosexual had not been raised.
157. Id. at 10.
158. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
159. Steffan, 780 F. Supp. at 12.
160. Id. In an explanation of why a conduct case was controlling in Steffan's status case,
the court stated:
[I]t has not been shown in this case that lifelong, or even career-long celibacy
among those with a homosexual orientation is the rule rather than the exception
.... The plaintiff has stated his sexual preference for people of the same gender
as himself and has thereby demonstrated a propensity to engage in conduct
which both parties agree is clearly regulable under Dronenburg. Unless it can
be shown that the plaintiff has some commitment to celibate living, the pre-
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the court noted concerns for a standard of morality and protection of pri-
vacy as legitimate purposes of the exclusionary regulation. 161 Finally, the
court took judicial notice of a matter not alleged or briefed by the parties.
Judge Gasch wrote three pages in a sixteen page opinion to address the mili-
tary's concern for protecting the health of the armed forces against the HIV
epidemic. 162
The Ninth Circuit rendered the least deferential ruling by the judiciary in
recent years regarding the constitutionality of discharge because of status as
a homosexual. 163 The Army discovered that Captain Dusty Pruitt was ho-
mosexual when the Los Angeles Times published an article discussing the
struggle invoked by religion, the military, and homosexuality. 164 When the
interview with Pruitt was published, she had served in the Army and the
Army Reserve for a total of twelve years and was to be promoted to Major
just nine days later. After an investigation beginning in January 1983, the
Army determined that Pruitt was a homosexual and issued an honorable
discharge on July 9, 1986. At the time of her discharge, Captain Pruitt had
served in the United States military for over fifteen years.
Pruitt filed suit in district court alleging that her discharge was based
solely on an admission of homosexuality and therefore violated the First
Amendment. The district court found that it was required to grant substan-
tial deference to the military's determination that homosexuality was not
compatible with military service. 165 Accordingly, it held that the regula-
tions were constitutional. 166
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed that there was no infringement of
First Amendment speech. 167 The appeals court found that Pruitt was dis-
charged for being a homosexual and not because of the content of her
speech.168 The opinion then explained that the Army was discharging ser-
vicemembers because of their status as homosexuals and determined that the
sumption must be, and it is rational for the Navy to believe, that plaintiff could
one day have acted on his preferences in violation of regulations prohibiting
such conduct.
Id. at 12-13.
161. Id. at 13.
162. Id. at 13-16.
163. See Pruitt v. Cheney, No. 87-5914, 1992 WL 92128 (9th Cir. May 8, 1992).
164. Pastor Resolves Gay, God Conflict, Los ANGELES TIMES, Jan. 27, 1983.
165. Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625, 627 (D. Cal. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
No. 87-5914, 1992 WL 92128 (9th Cir. May 8, 1992).
166. Id.
167. Pruitt v. Cheney, No. 87-5914, 1992 WL 92128, at *3 (9th Cir. May 8, 1992).
168. Id. Judge Canby noted the similarity of the facts in this case to that of Miriam Ben-
Shalom. He quoted the Seventh Circuit's opinion in the Ben-Shalom case which said:
[Appellant] is free under the regulation to say anything she pleases about homo-
sexuality and about the Army's policy toward homosexuality. She is free to
advocate that the Army change its stance; she is free to know and talk to homo-
sexuals if she wishes. What [appellant] cannot do, and remain in the Army, is to
declare herself to be a homosexual. Although that is, in some sense speech, it is
also an act of identification. And it is the identity that makes her ineligible for
military service, not the speaking of it aloud.
Id. (quoting Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990)).
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correct issue was whether the Army was entitled to do SO. 1 6 9
Applying equal protection review standards, the appeals court first found
that there was no legal support for the Army's claim that its regulations had
a rational basis °7 0 as a matter of law. 17 ' The court noted that Pruitt should
have the opportunity to contest the rationality of the Army's basis for its
regulation.' 72 Regarding deference to the military, the Ninth Circuit stated
that, without a trial court record demonstrating the basis for the Army's
regulation, any ruling on the constitutionality of the regulation would effec-
tively deny judicial review of Pruitt's discharge. 7 3 Accordingly, the court of
appeals remanded Pruitt's case to the district court for a determination of
whether the Army's discriminatory regulations were rationally related to a
permissible governmental purpose. 17 4
169. Id. The appeals court panel found that Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981), was distinguish-
able because it had considered a discharge for conduct. Additionally, the Belier court had
considered evidence of the basis for the military regulations being challenged, where the Pruitt
trial court had dismissed on a motion without an evidenciary hearing. Finally, the appeals
court described Belier as a substantive due process case which had not considered the equal
protection claim of discrimination presented to the Pruitt court. More significant than the
distinctions between these cases, however, is Judge Canby's observance that the Belier opinion
had considered prejudice against homosexuals as a permissible basis for upholding the military
policy. He then noted that societal prejudices could no longer serve as justification for discrim-
inatory regulations. Pruitt, 1992 WL 92128, at *5 (citing Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429
(1984) and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985)).
170. The court noted that it had relied in part on Bowers v. Hardwick in determining that it
would not require a higher standard of equal protection review. It distinguished both Hard-
wick and High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1990), from the case at hand because those
cases had addressed conduct rather than status as a homosexual. Because this case raised
discrimination on the basis of status, the court found that there was no stare decisis barrier to
active rational basis review. Pruitt, 1992 WL 92128, at *6 & n.5.
171. Pruitt, 1992 WL 92128, at *7. The court discussed its prior ruling in High Tech Gays
in which it required the Department of Defense to demonstrate a rational basis for its discrimi-
natory practice of subjecting homosexuals to expanded investigations prior to granting security
clearances. The Pruitt court explained that the presentation of evidence to support a claim of a
rational basis was necessary and followed the "active rational basis review" that the Supreme
Court had applied in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. At the time of this writing, the Pruitt case was on remand to the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California. It is clear from the Ninth Circuit opinion in this
case that the military will have to do more than simply rely on its stated policy as evidence of a
rational basis for its regulations which discriminate against homosexuals. Historically, courts
have accepted the Defense Department's conclusory statement that homosexuals are incom-
patible with military service without requiring any objective proof of why this should be true.
The hard data demonstrates that many persons of a homosexual orientation have served ex-
tended terms in the military and continue to be quite compatible with military service. PER-
SEREC REPORT, supra note 1, at 21-24, B-i. The cases addressed in this Comment each
primarily involve servicemembers with significant military service terms. The majority of
these individuals had excelled in their military careers until they were discovered to be homo.
sexual. There is no evidence of blackmail against homosexuals or that homosexuals have had
difficulty in commanding the respect of their subordinates. It is equally clear that the Ninth





If a soldier commits an overt act of homosexual behavior, that soldier is
subject to discharge.' 75 Additionally, the servicemember may be subject to
court martial for violation of the military sodomy statute. 76 Notably, it is
irrelevant under military policy whether the activity occurs in public or in
private, with another enlisted person or with a civilian, on or off base, or
during working hours or while on leave. ' 77 The most interesting enigma of
the military policy is that a heterosexual may commit a "homosexual act",
even a criminal act, and remain in the military; however, for a homosexual
who neither commits a homosexual act nor intends to, discharge is
mandatory. 78
In 1975 Leonard Matlovich told his commanding officers that he was ho-
mosexual. At the time of this admission he had served in the Air Force for
twelve years and was considered an excellent airman. Technical Sergeant
Matlovich requested a waiver of the Air Force regulation requiring dis-
charge of homosexuals.' 79 During the ensuing investigation, Matlovich dis-
cussed his sexual activities while in the service, stating that all such activity
had occurred with consenting adult men in private while off-base and off-
duty. Matlovich received an involuntary administrative honorable discharge
seven months after disclosing his sexual orientation to his superiors.
When Matlovich's case reached the appeals court, the primary issue was
whether the military could exclude individuals for private consensual homo-
175. See DOD Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R. pt. 41, app. A, pt. I.H.I.c.(l) ("A member
shall be separated under this section if... [t]he member has engaged in, attempted to engage
in, or solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts .... ")
176. See Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1991).
177. See id. §§ 802, 805 (providing that all persons who are "members of a regular compo-
nent of the armed forces", whether on active duty or retired, are subject to the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, which is applicable "in all places").
178. See DOD Directive 1332.14, supra note 1. This was pointed out by Judge Gordon in
his grant of summary judgment in Ben-Shalom II, see supra notes 111-121 and accompanying
text, where he stated:
If a person, such a Sergeant BenShalom [sic], has the status of having a homo-
sexual orientation and that person engages in speech which discloses or other-
wise acknowledges that status, then that person is subject to an automatic,
nonwaivable disqualification to reenlistment, regardless whether that person has
engaged in or intends to engage in actual homosexual conduct .... If a person
with a heterosexual orientation engages in homosexual conduct, that person can
avoid the consequences of [the regulations] upon proof of his or her heterosexual
orientation. In other words, status based on heterosexual orientation may be a
defense to the commission of homosexual acts, and a person with a heterosexual
orientation may engage in conduct which is prohibited on the part of a person
with a homosexual orientation.
Ben-Shalom, 703 F. Supp. at 1374-75.
179. Under the regulations then in effect, an exception to the discharge requirement could
be made when "the most unusual circumstances exist and provided the airman's ability to
perform military service has not been compromised." Air Force Manual 39-12 (Change 4),
para. 2-103, Oct. 21, 1970. This exception is no longer available. Current directives allow
retention only for a limited time in the interest of national security. DOD Directive 1332.14,
supra note 1, at para. H.3.g.(2).
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sexual activity.' 8 0 The court did not reach the constitutional question.' 8 '
Instead, it remanded the case to the Air Force with instructions to articulate
the unusual circumstances under which a homosexual servicemember may
be retained.' 8 2 In its rationale for requiring this explanation, the court indi-
cated that a standard such as whether a servicemember had publicized his
sexual orientation might be considered arbitrary and capricious.18 3
In 1980 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the constitutionality
of Naval discharges of three servicemembers who had been separated from
the service because of admission of homosexual conduct.' 84 Mary Saal,
James Miller, and Dennis Beller each admitted during the course of investi-
gation to having engaged in homosexual activity while in the Navy.
Saal was recommended for discharge but, following suit for injunctive re-
lief, the Navy was enjoined from discharging her pending resolution on the
merits. Her term of enlistment expired prior to rendition of a final order and
she was honorably discharged. The Navy then designated her as ineligible
for reenlistment and Saal amended her complaint to claim a violation of her
constitutional right to due process. Her request to extend her enlistment
also was denied. The district court held that Saal's application for reenlist-
ment must be considered without regard to regulations requiring exclusion
of homosexuals. 185
Miller was to receive a general discharge for misconduct based on having
committed homosexual acts while in the service. Like Saal, his discharge
was stayed until final resolution of his case. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the Navy and the circuit court continued the stay of
Miller's discharge pending outcome of the appeal.1 8 6 Similarly, Miller at-
tempted to reenlist following completion of his tour of duty and his applica-
tion was also denied. Beller received an honorable discharge for unfitness
following the district court's judgment in favor of the Navy. He did not
attempt to reenlist.
180. Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The
military relied on the Supreme Court's summary affirmation of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attor-
ney. Matlovich argued that Carey demonstrated the issue had not been decided.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 856. The record demonstrated that the Air Force had at times retained homo-
sexuals under the unusual circumstances exception, however no information was presented as
to how those cases differed from that of Matlovich. Id. at 855. Additionally, the Air Force
Board for the Correction of Military Records had stated that even the presence of unusual
circumstances would not require that Matlovich be retained, but would merely permit his
retention at the discretion of Air Force. Id. at 856.
183. Id. at 856-57. The opinion of the district court on remand is unpublished and con-
tains no findings. No. Civ. A. 75-1750, 1980 WL 237 (D. D.C. Sept. 10, 1980). The court
ordered that the 1975 discharge of Matlovich be declared void and that Matlovich be rein-
stated with full active duty pay and time served as if he had not been discharged. Id.
Matlovich settled for the awarded back pay and promotion with an honorable discharge.
MARY ANN HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO SERVE 154 (1990).
184. Belier v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981)
and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
185. Saal v. Middendorf, 427 F. Supp. 192, 202 (N.D. Cal. 1977), rev'd, 632 F.2d 788 (9th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) and cert. denied, 454 U.S. 855 (1981).
186. Belier, 632 F.2d at 794.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit first analyzed the policy of the Navy relating
to separation of homosexuals.187 It found that discharge of homosexuals
was mandatory and that any retention exception was unrelated to the indi-
vidual's fitness to serve in the Navy.' 88 The court then determined that
there was no violation of procedural due process because the plaintiffs were
not deprived of a property or liberty interest.189
Judge Kennedy, now Supreme Court Justice Kennedy, wrote for the
three-judge panel which held that the regulations did not violate any consti-
tutional right of substantive due process. 190 After determining the appropri-
ate standard of review, 19 1 the appeals court found several plausible grounds
187. Id. at 801. The Navy policy then in effect stated:
Members involved in homosexuality are military liabilities who cannot be toler-
ated in a military organization. In developing and documenting cases involving
homosexual conduct, commanding officers should be keenly aware that mem-
bers involved in homosexual acts are security and reliability risks who discredit
themselves and the naval service by their homosexual conduct. Their prompt
separation is essential.
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1900.9A (July 31, 1972). The regulations under which these
plaintiffs were discharged stated:
Members may be recommended for discharge by reason of unfitness for:...
e. Homosexual acts. Processing for discharge is mandatory. (See
SECNAVINST 1900.9 series for controlling policy and additional action re-
quired in cases involving homosexuality.) ...
BUPERSMAN § 3420220.
188. Belier, 632 F.2d at 802. The appeals court noted that a person who had committed
homosexual acts could be retained by the Navy in the discretion of the Secretary of the Navy
"if the individual is of extraordinary value to the Navy." Id. at 804. The court noted, how-
ever, that "an individual with an otherwise fine service record will not be retained unless the
Secretary concludes his record marks him as being highly unusual or especially valuable to the
Navy. This kind of consideration does not contemplate evaluating the fitness of an individual
to continue military service." Id. at 805.
189. Id. at 805-07. The court found that under the Navy regulations there could be no
continuing expectation of employment in the military once a servicemember admitted homo-
sexual activity. The discharges did not, therefore, deprive the plaintiffs of any constitutional
property interest without due process. Id. at 805. Additionally, the court found that the plain-
tiffs had admitted to committing homosexual acts and that the evidence did not indicate any
stigma attached to the service papers issued by the Navy in connection with the discharges
under honorable conditions. Id. at 807. Accordingly, the plaintiffs were not deprived of a
liberty interest. Id.
190. Id. at 807, 810. The court concluded:
[T]he importance of the government interests furthered, and to some extent the
relative impracticality at this time of achieving the Government's goals by regu-
lations which turn more precisely on the facts of an individual case, outweigh
whatever heightened solicitude is appropriate for consensual private homosexual
conduct.
Id. at 810. In dicta, the court advised that a finding that the regulations were constitutional
was not meant to imply that they were wise, and noted that "the constitutionality of the regu-
lations stems from the needs of the military, the Navy in particular, and from the unique
accommodation between military demands and what might be constitutionally protected activ-
ity in some other contexts." Id. at 812.
191. The opinion contains a lengthy discussion of the similarities and differences between
substantive due process analysis and equal protection analysis with regard to fundamental
rights. The court stated:
When conduct, either by virtue of its inadequate foundation in the continuing
traditions of our society or for some other reason, such as lack of connection
with interests recognized as private and protected, is subject to some govern-
ment regulation, then analysis under the substantive due process clause proceeds
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for the Navy's assertion that the regulations discharging homosexuals were
necessary for the achievement of the military mission. 192 The Ninth Circuit
recognized, for example, that prejudice provided a factual basis for the
Navy's claim that homosexuals would be unable to command the respect of
other personnel and that their presence would create tensions and hostili-
ties.' 93 The court also concluded that, although every concern asserted by
the Navy might not apply in each of the cases on appeal, each was a legiti-
mate concern and together they substantiated the relationship of the regula-
tions to the achievement of the Navy's goals. 194 While noting that these
goals could perhaps be achieved through a regulation which did not stretch
so broadly, the court found that the regulations were a reasonable attempt to
achieve governmental objectives while considering the individual interests
involved. 195
In 1981 the Ninth Circuit considered an equal protection challenge to the
Navy's criminal prosecution of Lieutenant Joseph G. Hatheway for commis-
sion of homosexual sodomy in violation of the UCMJ, Article 125.196 Hath-
eway claimed that the Navy was selectively prosecuting only homosexuals
under the sodomy laws even though heterosexual sodomy was also prohib-
ited. First, the court found, without explanation, that the exercise of the
fundamental right of privacy was implicated by the criminalization of homo-
sexual sodomy. 19 7 Then, asserting that the interests affected in the case
in much the same way as analysis under the lowest tier of equal protection scru-
tiny. A rational relation to a legitimate government interest will normally suf-
fice to uphold the regulation. At the other extreme, where the Government
seriously intrudes into matters which lie at the core of interests which deserve
due process protection, then the compelling state interest test employed in equal
protection cases may be used by the Court to describe the appropriate due pro-
cess analysis. The case before us lies somewhere between these two standards.
Id. at 808-09 (citations omitted). With regard to the application of substantive due process to
the cases on appeal, the court further stated:
The due process clause does not require the Government to show with particu-
larity that the reasons for the general policy of discharging homosexuals from
the Navy exist in a particular case before discharge is permitted .... Under the
analysis described in our opinion, individual treatment in some circumstances
might be required by substantive due process, depending on the outcome of the
balancing test. This case, however, involves neither middle-tier equal protection
analysis nor a situation where the only alternative means available to satisfy the
Government's goals consistent with due process is an individual showing of un-
fitness .... While the substantive due process test we describe in the text does
proceed on a case-by-case basis, it does not necessarily require the Government
in each case involving changing norms to show that the reasons for the regula-
tion apply in the particular case .... Discharge of the particular plaintiffs before
us would be rational, under minimal scrutiny, not because their particular cases
present the dangers which justify Navy policy, but instead because the general
policy of discharging all homosexuals is rational.
Id. at 808 n.20.
192. Id. at 811.
193. Id. at 811-12. The Navy had presented evidence claiming that "the great majority of
naval personnel ... despise/detest homosexuality" and would have difficulty trusting, respect-
ing, and living in close quarters with homosexuals. Id. at 811.
194. Id. at 812.
195. Id.
196. 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1991).
197. Hatheway v. Secretary of the Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1382 & n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. de-
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before it were similar to the interests affected in Belier v. Middendorf,198 the
court decided without further explanation to apply an intermediate level
equal protection review. 199 Again in reliance on the findings of Belier, the
Ninth Circuit panel concluded that "[t]he government has a compelling in-
terest in maintaining a strong military force" and "those who engage in ho-
mosexual acts severely compromise the government's ability to maintain
such a force." 2°° The Navy could, therefore, elect to prosecute those "viola-
tions of the UCMJ which are most likely to undermine discipline and order
in the military,"' 20' namely, homosexual sodomy.
Lieutenant Hatheway also raised a direct constitutional challenge to Arti-
cle 125, claiming that it violated his right to personal autonomy. Once
again, the panel relied on Belier in finding that the military's asserted inter-
ests outweighed any protection of private consensual homosexual acts. 20 2
In 1984, after adoption of the current DOD policy on homosexuality and
before the Supreme Court's ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick,20 3 the D.C. Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals2°4 considered the claim of naval Petty Officer James
L. Dronenburg.20 5 Dronenburg asserted that the Navy policy requiring dis-
charge of homosexuals violated his constitutional rights of privacy and equal
protection. The Navy had discharged Dronenburg on April 21, 1981, after
he admitted during an investigation that he had committed homosexual
acts. 20 6 The appeals court relied on the Supreme Court's summary affirma-
nied, 454 U.S. 864 (1981). The court declared: "Classifications which are based solely on
sexual preference implicate the 'right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from
unwarranted government intrusions into one's privacy.' "Id. at 1382 (quoting Stanley v. Geor-
gia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)). In explaining equal protection review, the court stated that
"[t]hough '(t)he courts have not designated homosexuals a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" classi-
fication so as to require more exacting scrutiny, heightened scrutiny is independently required
where a classification penalizes the exercise of a fundamental right.' It does so here." Id. at
1382 n.6 (quoting DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir. 1979))
(citations omitted).
198. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) and cert. denied, 454
U.S. 855 (1981). In Belier, the court specifically refrained from deciding whether there was a
fundamental right to participate in consensual private homosexual conduct. Id. at 807. In
determining that intermediate level review was appropriate, the Belier panel had acknowl-
edged the split among the circuits over whether homosexual conduct was entitled to constitu-
tional protection, and concluded that "the reasons which led the [Supreme] Court to protect
certain private decisions intimately linked with one's personality suggest that some kinds of
government regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial consti-
tutional challenge." Id. at 809-10 (citations omitted).
199. Hatheway, 641 F.2d at 1382. Intermediate level review requires that a discriminatory
regulation would be upheld as constitutional only if it is shown that the classification bears a
substantial relationship to an important governmental interest. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1384 (quoting Belier, 632 F.2d at 810). Additionally, the court noted that Hath-
eway's acts had not actually been committed in private since they were within the view of a
third party and, thus, Hatheway's right of personal autonomy carried less weight. Id.
203. See supra notes 46-56 and accompanying text. Justice White's majority opinion in
Hardwick tracks the logic expressed in Dronenburg.
204. Both Justice Scalia and Supreme Court appointee Bork sat on this three-judge panel.
Circuit Judge Bork wrote the decision of the Court.
205. Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
206. At the time of his discharge, Dronenburg had served nine years in the Navy. The
discharge was based on Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1900.9C (Jan. 20, 1978) that pro-
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tion of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney to find that the right of privacy did
not protect homosexual activity. 20 7 Additionally, the court considered the
line of cases addressing constitutional privacy rights208 and found that these
cases did not provide any criteria by which lower federal courts could deter-
mine what activities were within the protection of the right of privacy. 2°9
Further, the appeals court found that the areas listed by the Supreme Court
as protected under the right of privacy 210 were unrelated to the right to ho-
mosexual conduct asserted by Dronenburg.21I Additionally, the D.C. Cir-
cuit found that the right to homosexual conduct was not among those rights
"that are 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "212
Finding no precedent for constitutional protection of the right to engage in
homosexual activity, the circuit court declined to create what it termed a
new constitutional right.213 The court then concluded that, as "legislation
may implement morality, . . . this regulation bears a rational relationship to
a permissible end."' 214 Finally, the court stated that, because homosexual
conduct would affect morale and discipline, the Navy had justifiably deter-
mined that such conduct would hinder its ability to carry out the military
mission. The discharge of homosexuals therefore promoted the legitimate
interests asserted by the Navy.2 15 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit upheld the
vided: "Any member [of the Navy] who solicits, attempts or engages in homosexual acts shall
normally be separated from the naval service. The presence of such a member in a military
environment seriously impairs combat readiness, efficiency, security and morale."
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1389. The only exception to mandatory discharge was when the
homosexual act was committed on "a single occasion" by someone who "does not profess or
demonstrate proclivity to repeat such an act" and where the act committed "is not likely to
present any adverse impact either upon the member's continued performance of military duties
or upon the readiness, efficiency, or morale of the unit to which the member is assigned ... 
Secretary of the Navy Instruction 1900.9C at 6b (Jan. 20, 1978).
207. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1391-92.
208. Id. at 1392-95 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)).
209. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1392. Citing Griswold, the panel stated: "[Griswold] did not
indicate what other activities [aside from the right of a husband and wife to use contraceptives]
might be protected by the new right of privacy and did not provide any guidance for reasoning
about future claims laid under that right." Id. With regard to Eisenstadt, the panel asserted
that the opinion did not provide the criteria by which a court could make the necessary deter-
minations of "whether the challenged governmental regulation was 'unwarranted' and whether
the regulation was of a matter 'so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.' " Id. at 1393 (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
Finally, the panel stated "the Court provided no explanatory principle that informs a lower
court how to reason about what is and what is not encompassed by the right of privacy." Id.
at 1395.
210. Marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and edu-
cation. Id. at 1394 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-153 (1973) (citing Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-454 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-542 (1942);
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923))).
211. Dronenberg, 741 F.2d at 1395-96.
212. Id. at 1396.
213. Id. at 1397.




Navy's discharge regulations as constitutional and rationally related to legit-
imate interests. 2 16
IV. WHAT IS THE FUTURE OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY FOR
HOMOSEXUALS IN THE MILITARY?
Distinctions between disclosure, status, and conduct have been generally
disregarded by the courts when considering right of privacy challenges to
military exclusion cases. This failure to distinguish merits close scrutiny.
Most courts have applied a conduct standard to the cases presenting only
evidence of status. Under military regulations, status is determined by the
belief of the recruit or servicemember and not by conduct.
Bowers v. Hardwick held that homosexual sodomy is not an activity pro-
tected by the fundamental right of privacy. 2 17 The Georgia statute before
the Court in Hardwick prohibited "any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another." 2 18 Hardwick's holding is
limited, therefore, to this one particular form of homosexual conduct.21 9
The Uniform Code of Military Justice defines sodomy as engaging in "un-
natural carnal copulation with another person of the same or opposite sex or
with any animal .... "220 Presumably, although the military sodomy statute
216. Id. In a dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
four judges of the eleven-judge D.C. Circuit joined in a scathing attack on the Dronenburg
opinion. Chief Judge Robinson wrote:
[W]e are deeply troubled by the use of the panel's decision to air a revisionist
view of constitutional jurisprudence.
The panel's extravagant exegesis on the constitutional right of privacy was
wholly unnecessary to decide the case before the court. The ratio decidendi of
the panel decision is fairly well stated in the last paragraph of the opinion. Ju-
rists are free to state their personal views in a variety of forums, but the opinions
of this court are not proper occasions to throw down gauntlets to the Supreme
Court.
We find particularly inappropriate the panel's attempt to wipe away selected
Supreme Court decisions in the name of judicial restraint. Regardless whether it
is the proper role of lower federal courts to "create new constitutional rights,"
surely it is not their function to conduct a general spring cleaning of constitu-
tional law. Judicial restraint begins at home.
Dronenburg v. Zech, 746 F.2d 1579, 1580 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (Robinson, C.J., dissenting)
denying reh'g to 741 F.2d 1388, 1396 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The dissent further stated:
We intimate no view as to whether the constitutional right of privacy encom-
passes a right to engage in homosexual conduct, whether military regulations
warrant a relaxed standard of review, or whether the Navy policy challenged in
this case is ultimately sustainable. What we do maintain is that the panel failed
to resolve any of these compelling issues in a satisfactory manner. Because we
believe that the panel substituted its own doctrinal preferences for the constitu-
tional principles established by the Supreme Court, we would vacate the deci-
sion of the panel and hear the case anew.
Id. at 1581.
217. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
218. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
219. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2.
220. UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 925, art. 125(a). The Manual for Courts Martial defines "unnatu-
ral carnal copulation" as "tak[ing] into the person's mouth or antis the sexual organ of another
person or of an animal; or [placing] that person's organ in the mouth or anus of another person
or an animal; or [having] carnal copulation in any opening of the body, except the sexual parts,
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defines sodomy differently than the Georgia statute, it would withstand con-
stitutional review on the same basis as the Georgia statute. Accordingly, the
military could constitutionally prohibit the commission of homosexual sod-
omy by its members. This does not resolve the question of whether the mili-
tary may constitutionally exclude members, through discharge or refusal to
enlist, on the basis of homosexual status alone.
The Defense Department is not excluding homosexuals because they have
committed sodomy. The military prohibits membership in the armed serv-
ices by anyone who has the status of being homosexual.22 1 This status is
generally determined by the servicemember's own belief that he or she is
homosexual. 22 2 Evidence of homosexual acts by a servicemember will not
necessarily result in exclusion. 223 It is the belief that is determinative, not
the conduct. Therefore, the issue becomes whether the military may consti-
tutionally exclude persons from service on the basis of their belief about their
own sexuality.
Personal beliefs are traditionally considered to be protected under the Bill
of Rights. It is an unusual situation where a person may be compelled to
disclose their personal beliefs and then, on the basis of those beliefs, face
denial of benefits or even prosecution. Yet the military requires all recruits
to disclose this highly personal information before they may join the service
and, on the basis of the belief disclosed, individuals are excluded from
service.
In a case involving the enlistment of a soldier who has committed homo-
sexual sodomy, no fundamental right is involved. It is therefore only neces-
sary for the military to demonstrate that the regulation excluding this soldier
from service is rationally related to a legitimate military interest. The mili-
tary, like the State, has a duty to protect the interests of its members from
crime. Homosexual sodomy is a crime under the UCMJ. Consequently, the
exclusion of a person who has committed homosexual sodomy is rationally
related to the prevention of crime. 224 While Hardwick is the law in this
country, the right of privacy will not prevent the exclusion of this soldier.
This is not determinative in the case of a person who has not committed
homosexual sodomy, but has the status of being homosexual.
Most courts have proceeded from the holding of Hardwick to conclude
that the right of privacy is not implicated in any case involving homosexual-
ity. The courts have applied the conduct standard of Hardwick, or the ear-
lier holding of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, to cases where there was no
with another person; or [having] carnal copulation with an animal." Manual for Courts Mar-
tial, Exec. Order No. 12,473 at iv-90 (Jul. 13, 1984).
See supra note 51 regarding state sodomy laws; see also Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 198 n.1
(Powell, J. concurring) (listing state sodomy statutes in effect); PERSEREC Report, supra note
1, at A-20 (describing status of non-military sodomy laws).
221. See supra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
223. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
224. Remaining unexplained by the military is why it has no similar interest in preventing




evidence of conduct. 225 In other words, because a person has no fundamen-
tal right to commit sodomy, many judges have concluded there is also no
fundamental right to be homosexual. This conclusion logically must rest on
the assumption that all homosexuals commit sodomy if the rational relation-
ship between the regulation and the military's interest is to be found. Yet no
court has required the military to demonstrate the truth of this assumption.
Even if this could be demonstrated, still another step is required. It must
also be shown that all people who believe themselves to be homosexual are in
fact homosexual 226 and therefore commit sodomy.
Hardwick did not hold that there is no fundamental right to believe that
one is homosexual. Personal beliefs appear to be at the heart of the constitu-
tional right of privacy cases. The holdings of those cases protected the free-
dom from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters fundamentally
affecting people. The Court has acknowledged the constitutional right of
privacy in the marital relationship, 227 in decisions on childbearing, 228 and in
the home. 229 Prior to finding a constitutional right of privacy, the Court
recognized that other Bill of Rights guarantees necessarily protected privacy
in association, procreation, and education of children. 230 In each of these
cases, the Court not only protected the right to hold certain beliefs, but also
prohibited the States from punishing citizens for acting on those beliefs. At
a minimum, the right of privacy has been held to protect against unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into beliefs. Unless we are to diverge signifi-
cantly from Supreme Court precedent, the military regulation requiring
exclusion of anyone who believes him or herself to be homosexual must be
found to infringe the fundamental right of privacy.
Where a fundamental right is infringed, the military must show that it has
a compelling interest. The regulation imposed must serve this compelling
interest. Additionally, the regulation must infringe on that fundamental
right as little as possible. The military should then be required to demon-
strate that a compelling interest is served by its exclusion of persons who
hold the belief that they are homosexual.
Courts have had no trouble in finding that the interests asserted by the
225. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004
(1990); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1003 (1990); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984); Steffan v. Cheney,
733 F. Supp. 115 (D. D.C. 1989).
226. Recent medical findings lend support to the notion that homosexuality is a biological
condition and therefore immutable. See McNeil/Lehrer News Hour (television broadcast, Aug.
30, 1991); Natalie Angier, Ideas & Trends, The Biology of What it Means to be Gay, NEW
YORK TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at 4-1. Such a finding would greatly increase the likelihood of
homosexuals being held to constitute a suspect class under equal protection analysis. The
compelling interest standard would then be applied to the military's regulation, despite the
lack of implicating a fundamental right. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
227. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see supra notes 20-24 and accompany-
ing text.
228. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S 438 (1972); see supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
229. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 46
PRIVACY & THE MILITARY
military (morale, discipline, national security, public acceptance, etc.) are
compelling. Until Pruitt, however, the military has not been required to
demonstrate how any of these interests are served by a regulation excluding
homosexuals. Other courts have simply deferred to the military's determi-
nation that its exclusionary policy served its interest. This determination has
been undermined in recent years. Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, recently stated that homosexuals no longer pose a security
risk.23 1 The national security concern is also undercut by the presence of
homosexuals in high-level security clearance positions outside of the mili-
tary. 2 3 2 Internal discipline and morale concerns are hard to believe given
the military's own estimates that as many as ten percent of its members are
homosexual. 233 Finally, while the public may express concern about the
presence of homosexuals, the concern is lessening as evidenced by the repeal
of sodomy laws in a majority of states, 234 the enactment of civil laws prohib-
iting discrimination against homosexuals, 235 and the election of homosexuals
to Congress and state legislatures. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney ac-
knowledged the difficulty in explaining the continuing exclusion of homosex-
uals from the military when he said it was a policy he inherited and "a bit of
an old chestnut. '23 6 Surely courts are not required to continue to defer to an
outdated determination by military leaders which has no basis in the present.
Finally, Hardwick did not address the chilling effect that a regulation ex-
cluding one from the military on the basis of personal belief would have on
the right to hold that belief. The right of privacy is not only a positive right,
but also a negative right. The government may not infringe on the right of
privacy by either limiting its expression or by requiring its expression. The
military excludes persons on the basis of their sexuality and, in order to
make the determination whether a person is homosexual, requires recruits to
declare their belief about their own sexuality. It is hard to imagine a more
private interest. Unfortunately, there appear to be no cases directly chal-
lenging this disclosure requirement.
The courts appear to draw a clearer line between disclosure and conduct
than between status and conduct. Although the military policy excludes on
the basis of status, the military has occasionally focused on conduct in at-
tempting to require disclosure. In Watkins,237 the military was ordered to
consider reenlistment of the servicemember without regard to his status as a
homosexual. The Army then attempted to ask Watkins about his sexual
conduct on the ground that it has an interest in the commission of crime.
231. Federal News Service, Hearing of the House Budget Committee, Feb. 5, 1992.
232. See DOD Directive 5200.2.R., supra note 1. The military's own reports have repeat-
edly stated that there is no evidence that homosexuals pose a greater security risk than heter-
osexuals. See Gibson, Report of the Navy for the Revision of Policies, Procedures and
Directives Dealing with Homosexuals (1978); PERSEREC Report, supra note l, at 29.
233. PERSEREC Report, supra note 1, at 24.
234. See supra note 52. See also Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
235. See PERSEREC Report, supra note 1, at A-21.
236. Cheney Won't Fight Ban on Homosexuals, USA TODAY (Final ed.), Aug. 1, 1991,
News 4-A.
237. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
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The court refused to require disclosure of past conduct. In Steffan, 238 the
Navy discharged Steffan because of status as a homosexual. In depositions
pursuant to Steffan's appeal, the Navy asked about his sexual conduct. Here
too, the court refused to require this disclosure, finding that conduct was not
in issue since it was not the basis for the discharge.
Distinguishing between disclosure and conduct is a step in the right direc-
tion for the courts. It does not provide much protection for most individu-
als, however, because a recruit or servicemember who willingly admits their
homosexuality will be denied the right to serve. In the cases challenging the
exclusion of servicemembers because of their statements that they were ho-
mosexual, the courts have applied the conduct standard and held that the
servicemember was being discharged for being homosexual rather than for
saying he or she was homosexual. The absence of a line between status and
conduct creates a Catch-22 for anyone who happens to be homosexual and
desires to serve their country in the military.
The fiscal cost to the public in enforcing this regulation is high. The Gen-
eral Accounting Office reported in 1984 that 14,311 members were dis-
charged on the basis of homosexuality during the preceding ten years.23 9
For each discharged soldier, the public had invested $12,299 in getting that
soldier to their first duty station, basically induction and basic training
CoStS. 2 40 The average soldier discharged on the basis of homosexuality had
spent three years in the service. 24' The GAO could not estimate the cost of
prosecuting these discharges or of defending them on appeal. 242 The social
cost may also be high. For years, the military fought the racial integration
of its members for many of the same reasons asserted here.243 The military
declined to enlist women, again for many of the same reasons. History has
shown that the military's concerns were groundless. The future will likely
show that the military's concerns about homosexuals are likewise without
foundation.
238. See supra notes 145-162 and accompanying text.
239. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, B-216657 at 4 (Oct. 12, 1984).
240. Id. at 6.
241. Id. at 7.
242. Id. at 8.
243. See Watkins v. United States, 847 F.2d 1329, 1350-51 (9th Cir. 1988); PERSEREC
Report, supra note 1, at 29.
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